Challenging “Islamic State” is about facing the demands and needs of all Syrians and Iraqis.
With the conquests of Iraq’s Ramadi and Syria’s Palmyra in May 2015, or the recapture of parts of Northern Iraq’s Baiji in September – the home of the country’s most important oil refinery –, the Islamic State militia (IS) demonstrated that it remains a significant power. Neither a new, eventually less sectarian Iraqi government, nor massive US airstrikes weakened the jihadi militia: IS’s foundation comprises of the demands and needs of the Syrian and Iraqi people, which have been left unanswered by their regimes for the past decades. Thus, even if a large-scale military initiative would not eradicate IS. Its roots would not seize to exist within the societies and would probably serve another militia. Although most Syrians and Iraqis despise the Islamist rule they live under now, they still consider it the better option for them to the regimes of Damascus and Baghdad.
Consequently, the fight against IS is mostly about challenging the demands and needs of the people in Syria and Iraq. This article reduces the complexity of the phenomenon IS by describing it as being result from three types of roots: the sectarian, religious and power roots.
IS as a Sunni alternative – the sectarian roots
While sectarianism might be a minor reason for Syrians supporting IS, it definitely is a crucial one in Iraq. Syria is not divided along its religious and ethnic affiliations as Iraq. Following the economic sanctions against Iraq from 1990 onwards, the Baath party as the Sunni minority’s political organ more and more discriminated the Shia majority – the sects were socially and economically alienated. Consequently, the conditions for sectarian violence were already set as the Sunni domination was ousted with Saddam Hussein by the US in 2003. Iraq’s Baathist administration was dissolved. The Sunni spearhead in the following civil war was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his Al-Qaida in Iraq, which not only fought the Shia militias, but also targeted important Shia sites.
Following elections the Shia majority came into power in Iraq. And in this climate of distrust, Nuri al-Maliki’s elected Shia government relied on their own sect in running the government – discrimination against the Sunni spread. Accordingly, Maliki’s government did live up to its promises to include those Sunni who helped in fighting Sunni jihadis due to what was called the Sunni awakening. However, the turning point was when Nuri al-Maliki took over the government after coming second in elections in 2010, after Ayad Alawi’s Sunni and Shia party. As a consequence, newly forged loose bonds between Baathists and jihadis became relevant as many Sunni tribes aligned themselves with former al-Qaida Islamic State in the Levante against the Shia-dominated government.
As the Sunni’s trust into the Shia-dominated government faded, IS and its Islamist rule became the lesser evil for the Sunni population – IS was able to take over most of Iraq’s Sunni-dominated areas in 2014. In return, the Shia felt justified in their distrust towards the Sunni, who they suspect to be siding with IS anyway. Thus, the Sunni are considered not trustworthy in fighting the jihadi militia. Consequently, the Iraqi military’s Sunni divisions defending Ramadi were insufficiently armed and stood no chance against the well-equipped jihadi militia; even more as the Shia police fled the city at first sight of IS.
IS fulfills Islam’s prophecies – the religious roots
Attached to the sectarian issue of identity is the dimension of faith. IS is a religious militia. Although many former Baathist masterminds of IS are indifferent and ignorant towards religion and consider jihad simply as means to an end, the subjective religious motivation of many jihadis should not be underestimated. Following 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq, the publications of apocalyptic literature significantly increased in North Africa and the Middle East. Many IS fighters believe to be living in the dawn of the apocalypse and firmly belief that they contribute to evoking it by realizing the signs for its advent mentioned in Islamic tradition: Muslim groups fighting each other, atrocities against Muslims, the spread of disbelief and apostasy, the increase in extramarital sex, the reintroduction of slavery and many more. Thus indirectly, the apocalyptic belief legitimizes practices like savagery against Muslims and sex slavery which are actually considered sins in Islam.
All these signs lead to the appearance of the Mahdi, the redeemer of Islam, who will take the command of the Muslim community. Then a great final battle between the Muslims and the Romans will break out – Romans is widely interpreted as Europeans and Americans. The Syrian city of Dabiq is one of two mentioned possibilities, where the battle shall take place. Thus, IS’s conquest of the city in August 2014 was of high priority and importance. So in case a foreign intervention takes place and can somehow be associated with Dabiq, jihadis and probably more people will enthusiastically follow the call for the final battle.
IS as an effective political tool – the power roots
With only tens of thousands soldiers IS seized and managed to hold a large territory stretching over Syria and Iraq, which resembles a state of its own. Following the US invasion of Iraq and a feeling of powerlessness by the Iraqi population to actually challenge the US army, IS stands out as a group with the military capacities to win its battles. Also in Syria IS proved to be the most effective militia against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Nevertheless, the group’s military power and influence would not have been possible without the massive support of Sunni regional powers like Turkey, Saudi-Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf monarchies, who seized the opportunity to diminish non-Sunni influence in Iraq and Syria by supporting the Sunni militia IS.
What adds to the power of IS is the fear the jihadi militia spreads among its future opponents by perpetrating atrocities against their enemies and publicly spreading it in form of video clips. Furthermore, these acts of savagery symbolically emphasize its supremacy symbolically as they demonstrate that nothing stands between IS and its intentions – how cruel and unthinkable they might be.
Iran as a crucial element for sectarian reconciliation – challenging the sectarian roots of IS
Tackling the sectarian roots of IS is by far the most pressing issue. With the rise of Iran as a strong advocate for the Shia throughout the region after the revolution in 1979, the once suppressed Shia minorities all over the Middle East were supported in articulating their demands – often militarily. Especially the Sunni Gulf monarchies felt challenged by Iran and increased their ideological Salafi missions and their funding for Sunni militias. After the ouster of Saddam Hussein and the election of a Shia government, Iran became the new major ally of Iraq. As the main sponsor of Iraq’s Shia government, Iran is in the best position to push for sectarian reconciliation.
Iran finds itself today as a major regional power: Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon but also the US are relying heavily on the Shia militias sent and equipped by Tehran to fight IS in Syria and Iraq. In addition to that, Iran has regained much acceptance within the international community due to Hassan Rohani’s conciliatory policies, which eased tensions regarding its nuclear program. Thus, Tehran could be prone to calls from the Obama administration to pressure Iraq’s Shia lobbies towards more inclusive politics. Barack Obama might seize this opportunity in the last months of his presidency and actually engage in tackling a problem it massively helped creating by not taking affairs in the Middle East serious enough.
Syria’s Baath regime is fully aware that it has regained some international diplomatic acceptance and leverage due to its opposition to the greater enemy IS. However, as long as it remains reluctant to properly fight IS, the more the Syrian sects will be alienated due to IS’s sectarian ideology. As Syria’s ally, Iran might push the Assad regime to properly engage against IS before it is too late.
The need for joint Sunni action against jihadism – tackling the religious roots
In times of jihadi militias fueling political turmoil throughout the Middle East, the Sunni Arab League might be willing to tackle the source of the problem: conflict-prone Salafist interpretations of Islam. Massive oil revenues in the Sunni Gulf monarchies allowed the spread of Saudi-Arabia’s Wahhabism as well as related Salafi ideologies. While for many Arab League countries the Wahhabi and Salafi missions surely were a way to gain political influence – above all against Shia groups –, they are backfiring with IS destabilizing the whole region.
Following many Muslims’ outrage about IS’s atrocities, various religious counter-initiatives were organized: not only through religious scholars who openly stated their disapproval, but also through many Muslims all over the world on internet platforms. However, in order to be effectively tackled, various counter-strategies have to be taken to the government level of all Arab League countries, where Islamism was being supported for the last decades. In order to counter Salafist Islam, governmental support of the peace-centered Sufi approach to Muslim faith could be a proper option.[1]
Reconciling Syrians and Iraqis with their governments – targeting the power roots of IS
IS demonstrated to be an effective means of fulfilling political demands. As such, the jihadi group is considered a better alternative to the regimes in Syria and in Iraq. In a way, IS is the tragic heir of what was called the Arab Spring. As the emancipatory dynamics of the Arab Spring sought there way of articulation in Syria and in Iraq, they were ignored by their regimes and were canalized through IS’s jihadism. Thus, the inclusion and participation of the people of Syria and Iraq in governmental politics is a prerequisite for a less violent future. Syrians and Iraqis have to see their governments responding to their demands rather than as an opponent which is to be fought against militarily. It is up to Iraq’s prime minister Haidar al-Abadi to convince the Sunni Iraqis that their democratic confidence will not be betrayed in the next elections.
Bashar al-Assad could have succeeded if he had kept his promise of preparing the Syrians for a democratic system before all hope vanished as public protests were brutally crushed in 2011. Some still believe that Assad might still be able to reconcile with the Syrian population under the condition of dissolving the Baath party – he might still be more conciliatory than his eventually more hawkish Baath entourage. Most observers however insist on the necessity of the dissolution of the whole regime for any viable future for a unified Syria. Currently circulating peace plans proposed by Iran, the GCC countries, Russia as well as the US also seriously consider a future without Assad and the Baath. Elections in a post-Assad era under international supervision might be the only way to reconcile all Syrians with a central government in Damascus and to keep Syria unified.
The fight against IS cannot be won by military means alone. It is rather sectarian, religious and political issues in Iraq and Syria that have to be challenged in order to cut off the jihadi militia’s roots and weaken it considerably. However, as the regimes in Damascus and Iraq are in a political deadlock, international political engagement is indispensable for any sustainable strategy. Above all, the initiation of such strategies would currently serve the interests of crucial actors like Iran, the Arab League and GCC states as well as the US.
[1] Single individuals are already funding smaller Sufi missions.
Maximilian Lakitsch is researcher at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution – ASPR
