The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood – From Catharsis to Power: Part 2

The call for national self-determination and political participation within the framework of national politics has always been an inherent characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood´s ideology. Especially after the revolution of 2011 social and religious mobilization among its supporters became a means to overcome the corrupt structures, which had governed the state for as long as President Mubarak had been in charge. It is noteworthy though, that the Brotherhood participated in the demonstrations against Hosni Mubarak only after the first few days had passed and it became increasingly clear that a revolutionary dynamic was taking shape. This had much to do with their bad experiences during Nasser´s reign where the Brotherhood has been subject of harsh prosecution. They would not risk it happening again.

Shortly after Mubarak´s resignation in February 2011 they were the first player on the scene to found a political party (FJP) and to set themselves on top of the political system. They could do so because they enjoyed some sort of organizational freedom under Mubarak, which they used to uphold their welfare mission. This enabled them to maintain organizational structures, which allowed them to create a political party in very short term.

It´s initial huge success that followed was predominatly due to its mass-basis that could quickly be mobilized for elections. Another reason for their success in the first free parliamentary elections which took place from November 2011 until January 2012 was their status as subdued oppositional party by the regime, be it Nasser or Mubarak. They managed to represent themselves as guardians of the revolution14, as a clean and just party, always in service of the people. The 2011 Party-platform reflected exactly the mission of the Brotherhood and its claim to speak for the deprived classes of the Egyptian society. Crucial standpoints like Da´wa, reform and questions of ethical conduct remained a highlight in their thinking:

“We believe that the reform of inner, psychological and spiritual aspects is as important as the reform of the visible, material aspects. This is an eternal truth, which was first spoken out in the holy Quran: ´ Allah does not change a people’s lot unless they change what is in their hearts´. 15

This Verse is the nucleus of the Brotherhood´s reform -approach, which gears not just to social, economic and political reforms, but – in a broader sense – the islamization of the whole society. At the same time it entails the other central dogma of the Brotherhood: There is no division between religion and politics, as Bannā has put it over 80 years ago when he claimed that “nationalism is part of the belief-system.”16

But the gap between their moral approach in their platform and their Realpolitik just proves yet another time their political, ideological and strategic flexibility – mildly put – when it comes to adapting to the political situation on the ground in pursuit of their agenda. They simply followed a twofold strategy: By writing a party-platform which tried to fulfill  the wishes of the young revolutionaries by paying tribute to them and to fulfill the aspirations of its Islamic electorate.

In the political arena however, they tried not to be crushed by the Supreme Council  of  the  Armed  Forces  (SCAF),  which  took  over  after  Mubarak´s resignation. In an evaluation of their strategic situation, the Brotherhood – leadership decided to support the SCAF against the huge protests which shook the country from January 2011 until the parliamentary elections at the end of the same year. This resulted in a deafening silence of the Brotherhood over the police brutality in that year against peaceful demonstrators as well as the over 12.000 military trials against opponents of the SCAF.17 In return for their support, the Brotherhood was not politically prosecuted in that period.

The unofficial alliance between the two major players of Egyptian politics was always accompanied by mistrust and continuous bargaining over the distribution of power thoughout. This was perfectly exemplified when in October 2011 the Brotherhood along with many other political parties signed a declaration “supporting the SCAF” after they had forced the SCAF to withdraw a new draft electoral law, allowing it to assign one third of parliamentary seats to neutral candidates.18

This ultimately led to a view among many Egyptians that the Brotherhood was betraying the ideals of the revolution. Nonetheless, they were still seen as the lesser of two evils. Hence, and to the Military´s consternation, Morsi won the presidential elections against its candidate, Ahmed Shafiq. But it speaks volumes that Shafiq, loathed by many Egyptians, since he was associated with the old regime, gained 12 Million votes in the second round of the elections.19 What followed was a series of actions taken by the SCAF, parts of the bureaucratic elites as well as the justice system – which still consisted of Mubarak-loyal cadres20 – to counterbalance the Brotherhoods new powers. After Hussein al- Tantawis statement, then minister of defense and head of the SCAF, that “Egypt won’t fall into the hands of only one faction [Brotherhood]” 21, the Supreme Court dissolved  the  elected  parliament  and  the  SCAF  issued  a  constitutional amendment aimed at strongly restricting the powers of the new president.22

Without a functioning parliament and the powers of the president restricted, the Brotherhood found itself in the paradox situation that despite their victory in two consecutive elections, they lacked the formal institutional backing to implement urgent economic and social reforms in order to get Egypt back on track. 23

Instead, they tried to push their normative agenda by installing an Islamic state of virtue in which the focus did not lie so much on the mode of governance, as on the end of it, i.e. to enable the pious Muslim to live according to the requirements of Islamic principles laid out in the Sharia. Here they strived to implement a new constitution which gives sharia-law more space but at the same time abides by the more liberal interpretation that the general principles and norms of sharia -law like social justice, equality of the believers and freedom be adopted. The conflict evolving around the new constitution alienated even more secular Egyptians from the Brotherhood fearing that Egypt would lose its secular image.

Simultaneously, the Brotherhood connected its Islamic claim with a broad range of civil and human rights in order to stop the social and economic injustice prevailing in the Egyptian society. Their ambitious plan however, was thwarted by their lack of understanding for the rules of the game. They failed because they were not able to bundle the potential for social protest in the entire Egyptian society. Instead, they focused on their electorate only, forgetting that Egypt was still in a revolutionary situation which necessitated including all social interest – groups in the decision-making process. Or in other words: The emphasis on religious mobilization was bigger than that on alleviating the potential for social protest and offering people a mid-or- long-term economic perspective throughout all social classes and orientations.

 This led to a situation where even parts of its electorate broke off as it became increasingly clear that the leadership of the FJP was in no way capable of meeting the needs and obligations Egypt and its people had. This had several reasons:

Additionally, many GCC-countries like Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE stopped supporting Egypt financially, or to a much lesser degree the moment Mohammed Morsi had won the elections.25 This had much to do with their decades-long support of the Mubarak-regime and the Egyptian Military, strategic alliances in the region as well as their ideologically motivated adversion against the Brotherhood. Other states like Qatar however, tried to fill in, but this had had only a limited impact.

On the domestic level, continuous strikes, demonstrations and violent protests of different political groups led to a major setback in revenues from tourism as well as high unemployment rates.26 All these circumstances made it increasingly difficult for the Brotherhood to spend money and make politics. To the contrary, a possible bankruptcy  of  the  state  would  have  endangered  the  economic enterprises of the Military which amount to “one fifth of Egypt´s economic output”27, giving them the excuse to intervene.

The second reason for their failure is the assumption that a democratically elected government can do whatever it wants. This assumption derives from a lack of political culture in general and on the side of the Brotherhood in particular.

This blind spot resulted in politics, which were quite similar to that of the old regime in terms of decision making. The FJP should have seen that its victory at the polls was only by a very small margin28 and that most people had voted for Mohammed Morsi due to a lack of viable alternatives. Instead, it immediately started to plant its people at crucial positions in the system, trying to push its vision into the new constitution.

But probably Morsi´s biggest failure was to not use the momentum he gained when he retired some of the SCAF´s senior members and replaced them in August 2012 with younger, seemingly loyal officers. Ironically, among this reshuffle was defense minister Hussein al-Tantawi´s replacement by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who would later depose Mohamad Morsi from his position. By simultaneously annulling the constitutional amendment which had restricted his powers, he seemingly managed to limit the Military´s power. But instead of trying to build new alliances, comprising larger part s of the political spectrum, he went on to concede himself absolute powers in a decree he issued in November

the same year.29 This move was the beginning of the Brotherhood´s demise in power. After heavy protests, president Morsi had to take the decree back, leavi ng his personal credibility and that of his party ruined and the country more polarized than ever.

But it would be short-sighted to allocate the reasons for the military coup which ousted president Morsi solely on the mistakes the FJP and the Brotherhood had made and their deteriorating standing in the population. While it seemed that the Military under the leadership of defense minister Abdel Fattah al -Sisi simply took advantage of the growing popular discontent and fulfilled the demands of the Tamarrod-movement (“Rebellion”), as even many media outlets in the West have put it, some evidence hints at an orchestrated campaign led by the Military and others to topple the Brotherhood-led government:

There´s for instance the issue, that just a few days after Morsi was arrested on July 03, 2013, the Military received 12 Billion USD from different gulf-states safeguarding Egypt from bankruptcy.30 Tamarrod on the other hand, received help by members of the old establishment like former vice -president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Ms. Tahani Gebali. She admitted that she helped the movement to “create its strategy to appeal directly to the military to oust Mr. Morsi and pass the interim presidency to the chief of the constitutional court .”31

Eventually the Military never came to terms with the idea of a possible civil state and their role restrained to that of an observer. The ongoing power-struggle with the Brotherhood stands for itself. Since the Free Officers took power in 1952 the Military considered itself as preserver of security and order. Hence, the Coup of July 2013 in their eyes is only the correction of an aberration.

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14 See: Javaher-Haghighi, Peyman/Azad, Hassan/Noshadi, Hamid Reza: Arabellion. Die arabische Revolution für Freiheit und Brot von Kairo bis Damaskus [The Arab Revolution for Freedom and Bread from Cairo to Damascus], Münster: Unrast, p. 110 -111.

15 FJP: Party-platform (2011), online: http://www.fjponline.com/articles.php?pid=80 ; Koran-Verse cited here: Sure 13, Verse 11.

16 See: Al-Banna, Hassan: Majmu´at al-Rasa´il al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna, ibid. p. 51.

17 For the military trials see: Chams El-Dine, Cherine: The Military and Egypt´s Transformation

Process, in: SW P Comments 6, February 2013, p.3 -4, online-source: http://www.swp– berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C06_ced.pdf (last retrieved January 13, 2014).

18 See: Javaher-Haghighi et al., ibid. p. 103.

19 See: Gresh, Alain: Im neuen Ägypten [In the new Egypt], in: Le Monde diplomatique, 11/2012, p. 8.

20 See: Gresh, Alain: An der Hand der Armee [in the Military´s hands], in: Le Monde diplomatique, 08/2013, p. 5.

21 Gresh, Alain: Im neuen Ägypten, ibid. p. 8.

22 See: Javaher-Haghighi et al.: ibid. p. 112; Perthes, Volker: Putsch in Ägypten [Coup in Egypt], in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SW P), 04 July 2013, online -source: www.swp– berlin.org/de/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/putsch-in-aegypten.html (last retrieved: January 09, 2014).

23 Perthes, Volker: ibid.

24 FJP: Party-Platform (2011), online: http://www.fjponline.com/articles.php?pid=80 .

25 See: Gresh, Alain: Im neuen Ägypten, ibid. p. 8.

26 See: Ahram Online: Egypt’s unemployment rate hits record high in second quarter, August 14,

2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/50405.aspx (last retrieved January 13, 2014); Ahram Online: Arab spring nations face delayed economic recovery: IMF, May 26, 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/72327.aspx (last retrieved 13 January 2014).

27 Fürtig, Henner: Präsidentensturz in Ägypten [Coup in Egypt], in GIGA Focus Nahost 2/2011, p.4, online-source: http://paperc.de/19768-praesidentensturz-in-aegypten-giga-focus-nahost-2-2011 9773186236785#!/pages/4 (last retrieved January 13, 2014).

28 See: Perthes, Volker: ibid.

29 See: Gresh, Alain: An der Hand der Armee, ibid. p. 5.

30 See: Roll, Stephan: Aussenansicht, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, p. 2, July 15, 2013.

31 See: Hubbar, Ben/ Kirkpatrick, David D.: Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi, in: NYT, July 10, 2013, online-source: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/middleeast/improvements -in-egypt-suggest-a-campaign-that-undermined-morsi.html?pagewanted=all (last retrieved: January 14, 2014).