When I found out about the title of the article, I was very interested to read about the author’s writing on this complex issue. It is one of the most written topics in the area of peacekeeping and interventions and yet, very few scholars manage to present an academically objective perspective of the situation, no matter which angle they look at it from. The author’s choice to investigate the USA, France, Belgium and the UN is indeed justified and makes perfect sense as these were, some still are, the four main outside players in the Rwandan affairs. However, regional and local players – Uganda, DRC and groups within Rwanda were equally influential from the start to the end of the conflict. The then rebel group RPF was trained and militarily supported by Uganda while DRC, then Zaire, was a strong military supporter of the former Rwandan government during the war. Over the course of the war from October 1990, radical groups were formed in Rwanda which opposed any peace deal between the government and the RPF. In this respect, regional actors played an even greater role in the events leading to the genocide which are very important but most writings don’t focus on. My thesis on the whole intervention dilemma is simple: Every intervention today is driven by national interests. In case of Rwanda, there is very little to offer to the international community, fortunately or unfortunately. Thus very few countries were willing to get in. Yes Somalia had just been disastrous for the US and President Clinton was not ready to commit US support to another African conflict but we must never forget that, especially for the USA, interests come before anything else. I strongly believe that the USA would not have rushed into Rwanda even if Somalia would not have happened. I therefore agree with the author that the lack of political and economic interest in Rwanda was one of the reasons for not intervening.
With regards to the role of Belgium in the conflict, I do not believe that the establishment of the ethnic-based ID cards ‘created’ the basis for the genocide. I would say it created the basis for further divide among Rwandans which was already in existence since the 14th century when Tutsis arrived in the area. It is important to remember that over time, Hutu or Tutsi were terms used to refer to social classes rather than ethnicity. As cattle herders in need for land, Tutsis managed to establish themselves quickly as supreme group in Rwanda. This was easily accepted by Hutus and it did not cause any major conflict until the 19th century when Rwanda went through a land distribution period which created a ‘patronage’ system allowing small groups of people to accumulate big areas of land. This was followed by the arrival of the Germans as colonizers in 1890. Like in other places where colonialism took place, the Germans favored minority Tutsis as their ruling collaborators. This exacerbated the tension caused by the land distribution and marked the beginning of a deep divide between Hutus and Tutsis. But perhaps the worst thing that led to the problem was the so called ‘Hamitic Theory’ by John Hanning Speke which suggested that Tutsis were more Europeans than the Hutus thus giving them superior status over the Hutus. All this happened before the Belgians arrived in 1914.
The role of France presented by the author is rather interesting because the author claims that somehow French actions directly led to the genocide. I think the claim is overstretched because I do not know of academic or any other type of evidence for this claim. It is true that France, with its ‘Francafrique’ policy, had a culture of protecting its closest allies in the region at all cost. This was true in Cameroon, Ivory Coast and others. Surprisingly, it was not the case in Zaire (now DRC) in 1996. But generally for France, relationships with French-speaking African leaders had developed into personal and family-like than political. Francafrique is well known for brotherhood-like approach to its members and defending Rwanda was like defending a brother in trouble or defending a French province. Politically and morally, it is difficult to imagine that Francois Mitterrand would have ignored his friend Juvenal Habyarimana when he was attacked. While I agree that the French intervention was one-sided, but so are most interventions, I do not see a direct connection to the genocide. Negotiations had been going on since 1992 and most of them were violated by RPF and made difficult by radical groups in Rwandan armed forces and political wings.
If you would to know more about the role of France in Africa you might be interested to watch the Al Jazeera programme ‘The French Africa Connection’.
Regarding the UN, well, there is not much to say about it except that one can add much more details and read or listen to testimonies from Gen. Dallaire, NGO workers and journalists who were there. The UN though is just a title. Member states decide what happens and what doesn’t. It was clear that since the USA was not willing to do anything, nothing was going to happen even from France. Regional countries had pledged their support but they needed logistics which was not available.
All in all, I think this article tried to make a case. For such a complex topic however, it could have been useful to provide more detailed information. The lack of historical information about the conflict is of a concern when you are presenting a case to people who are not familiar with it. I would therefore encourage the author to take into account historical background of the conflict in the next work.
Billy Batware is born in Rwanda and was 13 when the genocide took place.
