Malis Fast-Food Democracy

Last weekend on Sunday, 28th of July, the population of Mali was called to the boxes to decide about the future of the conflict-ridden state. Against all odds, no violent incidents happened but a bitter aftertaste remains. Fast-Food Democracy – built up fast, looking good, but is it satisfying in the long run?

In Mali, western Africa, an internal conflict between the northern and the southern regions has been smouldering for decades: the partly nomadic living Tuareg feel structurally discriminated by the government in Bamako and therefore announced the independent state of Azawad on April 6th 2012. It didn´t take long for some regional Islamist groups to join the Tuareg but to fight for their own specific interests (establishment of an Islamic state, sharia, etc.) and this conflict of interests led to a concrete conflict soon after. The Tuareg – or rather the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l´Azawad) – were pushed back and from then on the conflict was carried out primarily between the Malian Government/ Army and the Islamist groups (AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO).

The former democratically elected government was already disposed in March 2012 when the Malian military intended to take matters into their own hands, shortly after a transitional president was installed to ease the international pressure. The transitional president and his government couldn´t mitigate either and in the next few month there were countless assaults and quarrels, and the situation in northern Mali was escalating quickly. In Spring 2013 the Malian government finally came to terms with the MNLA and Ansar Dine; forced through mainly diplomatic pressure from the international community and the military operations of France and the ECOWAS.

Democracy and free elections are indeed something strongly positive, but the specific circumstances under which the elections are held are crucial to the long-term consequences. The people of Mali are now meeting this challenge and, afflicted by month after month of violent struggles, are willing to take their chances on peace and freedom into their own hands. Said chances and hopes can be destabilised quickly by several factors: mainly by the very short period of time between making peace with the rebels and conducting an election. The state had only two month to free itself from the horrors of the conflict and simultaneously try to manage the high bureaucratic and logistical obstacles of an election.

The agencies in charge didn´t even have a clue about the accurate number of citizens eligible to vote and therefore had to work only based on estimates and old data. A big part of the population didn´t possess an identity card and therefore could not go to the polls. These two factors were the main hurdles: the 8 million citizens had to be registered and provided with identity cards within two month. Further to lacking information about the population in Mali, the government was confronted with a total lack of information about the Malians fled to the countries nearby and those living in the Diaspora.

Due to the „co-operation“ with the ex-colonial power France, a French company was charged with the production of the identity cards and an „army“ of local and international election workers should help to deliver all the cards to the corresponding people in time. Poor overview and the factor time led to problems like people being registered under wrong names or residential adresses aso., they had to be found and registered painstakingly by the helpers. Local media reported whole communities left without a single identity card just a few days before the election, the actual extend of the “forgotten voices” are not apparent until now. But not only the forgotten ones, also the lost voices were posing a problem since the associated polling station was not noted on the identity cards. Especially people in the diaspora and regions in Mali‘s periphery were confused and accused the government of deliberately manipulating the poll.

Shortly before the election took place a new scandal came up: a new census estimated about 6,9 million identity cards actually needed, which means over a million “white cards” were produced and could be used to manipulate the election. Scrutineers soon clarified the situation, the remaining cards were currently in France and it should be nearly impossible to use them for a manipulation.

Northern Mali was closely observed these days: the strong presence of MINUSMA– troops should compensate for the lacking presence of international scrutineers and had to guarantee a secure and transparent poll, because some of the Islamic groups (esp. MUJAO) and splinters of the MNLA threatened to attack polling stations. A few days ahead of the election, helpers and people publicly speaking for the unity of the state were murdered and some of them kidnapped in Kidal and Tessalit in the northern provinces. On the election day itself there were surprisingly only a few smaller demonstrations, but no murders or bigger quarrels.

The participation rates on the election day was a big surprise too: last time there only around 30% of the population went to the polls but last Sunday all records were broken. In Timbuktu approximately 77% of the population went to the ballot boxes, in the northern regions the participation was noticeably lower (around 10% in Kidal) and less than a week after the first results are talking about 50%. Here lies another problem, because some persons went while additionally being authorised by one one or more persons: These persons therefore voted in the name of several other persons, exact numbers could not be clarified yet.

Even tough 28 candidates ran for the presidency, there were only two favourites right from the beginning: the former prime minister and dyed-in-the-wool politician Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the former minister and president of the ECOWAS Soumaila Cissé. Of the 28 candidates four were former prime ministers, many deputies and local politicians and also the offspring of the old political elite, and only one woman (also a deputy). According to the first official numbers, Keita won the election with over 40% of the votes, but he didn´t reach the absolute majority and so a second round will be held on august 11th, when people will be able to choose between him and Cissé. According to the media (and his followers) Keita will almost certainly be elected as president in the second round, time will tell if the estimations were correct.

Through the presence of hundreds of international scrutineers a relatively good overview about the transparency and legitimacy of the elections can be made: the head of the EU-mission announced shortly after closing the last polling stations that the election were held peacefully, transparently and free and there were no significant anomalies as far as they could tell. Other international scrutineers too expressed their satisfaction, mainly the high participation of the young population, women and disabled persons was appraised positively. The support and assistance by MINUSMA and ECOWAS (especially Nigeria) with materials such as printing paper, computers, etc. and the logistic support was applauded and said to be fundamental for the process.

Despite the largely positive feedback from the international community, many local NGOs and scrutineers denounced irregularities and failures: some of the polling stations were poorly provided with material and personnel, the personnel available was often poorly trained and the lack of information for the people prevented them from voting.
Keitas followers caused special fuss when they started celebrating Keitas victory only two hours after the end of the election. Immediately he was accused of manipulating the poll, but Keita himself called out to his followers to remain calm and wait for the official results. A few days later they were proven right and Keita will probably win the second round too.

Let´s try a short glimpse into the future (as far as that is possible based on the election programs): the main goal of the new government will be national reconciliation and security, behind that the preservation of the national unity and sovereignty will resonate through every action. The rest of Keitas programme is set up by the standard set of empty phrases about the fight against corruption, for the economy, youth, social systems, etc.

The elections in Mali were held only two month after the peace agreement and so far they seem to be held fair and free. But trying to force a country into elections so soon after a long-lasting violent conflict can undermine the future struggle for democracy and reconciliation, because conflict is rarely solved in such a short period of time. Time will show if this fast-food-democracy will really help the Malians to process the past and to go on into a bright and peaceful future.

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