The debate about new wars has gained a lot of currency in recent years. Scholars out of the field of International Relations as well as Peace and Conflict Studies argued that contemporary wars are qualitatively different form the nature of earlier wars; a distinction between old and new wars has to be made in order to analyse todays conflict in a more efficient way. The new war thesis has been made prominent by Mary Kaldor, who argues that “during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organised violence developed” (Kaldor 2006: 1). New wars thus developed out of the end of the Cold-War, and not only Kaldor argues in favour for this differentiation. Other authors, although using different terms, like van Creveld (‘low intensity wars’), Holsti (‘peoples war’) or Duffield (‘transnational wars’) also see this categorisation between old and new wars for granted (Fleming 2009: 218; 222; 236; Kalyvas 2001: 99). The following will briefly discuss three major characteristics of the new wars thesis and will argue that a differentiation between old and new wars is misleading, since many of its characteristics has already been presented in old wars. According to the new war thesis, post Cold-War conflicts are characterized by a change of actors, a massive increase of civilian casualties and development of a new “shadow” war economy. Actors in contemporary conflicts changed from state to non-state actors; from regular armies to irregular units. Mary Kaldor argues, that the main actor in old wars were armies, “vertically organised hierarchical units” under the command and control of the state (Kaldor 2006: 9).
But that with the end of the Cold-War and the emergence of new wars the state has lost its monopoly of military force, its authority is being challenged by various non-state actors (Münkler 2002: 16). Although state armies are still integrant parties in contemporary conflicts, a multitude of different actors, such as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs and mercenary groups are getting more and more involved in conflict and thus making it more complex (Kaldor 2006: 9). Further, it has been stated that new wars are characterised by an increase in violence and a increased ratio of civilian to military casualties. Kaldor states, that the ratio of civilians to military casualties used to be eight combatants to one civilian killed in old wars, but that this has been dramatically changed in new wars, where it is now approximately eight civilians to one combatant (Kaldor 2006: 9). In addition to the increase of civilian casualties, it is argued in favour for the new war thesis that they are “more bloody than any other kind of war since 1945” (Münkler 2002: 15). Münkler argues, that this is due to the changing type of conflict, from interstate to intrastate, and the fact that there are no distinctions being made between civilians and combatants (2002: 14-15). Lastly, the new emerged war economy is central characteristic of new wars, as it differs itself from the more conventional war economy by being globalised, decentralised and having low participation rate as well as high unemployment rates (Kaldor 2006: 10). As Kaldor concludes, these economies exists mostly out of “illegal trade in arms, drugs or valuable commodities such as oil or diamonds or human trafficking” (Kaldor 2006: 10).
But are these three factors necessarily new factors of conflict? And do they justify a characterisation
between old- and new wars?
Prominent example for the increasing complexity of conflict and the increasing number of actors is the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many paramilitary organisations, whose members were mostly mercenaries, were involved and approximately additional four thousand Mujahedin, supported by Iranian special operations, fought from the very beginning of the conflict (Reyna 2009: 295, Killingray 1989: 146). But the integration of private militias in conflict is not necessarily new. As argued by Reyna and Killingray, private militias were present during the colonial wars, sometimes in alliance with imperial troops and especially in the case of the colonial wars in Africa, mercenary armies have played an active role by helping the colonial troops in their conquest (Reyna 2009: 295; Killingray 1989: 146). The increase of casualties in conflict is one of the most prominent arguments in favour for the new war theory but lacks any support of evidence. There is little evidence or statistical analysis that explicit support the assumption of new wars being more “bloody” (Duffield 2001: 192). The notion of new wars being more fatal than old wars results out of the non-inclusion of certain wars into the analysis, like the Second Philippines War or the colonial wars in Asia and Africa (Wolfendale 2001: 16-17). Karnow shows, that the death ratio during the second Philippines War of 1899-1902, was 200000 civilians to 4000 American soldiers (1989: 194). This elucidates, that conflicts with similar ratios like new wars already existed and finally as Hall et. al. points out “the ratio of civilian to military casualties is lower in the ‘new wars’ than in the Cold War” (2006: 38).
Finally and lastly, the emergence of new war economies can be explained with the case of Charles Taylor, a local liberian warlord, who used foreign companies for financial and economic reasons (Duffield 2001: 176). The example of Chales Taylor shows, that contemporary conflicts changed to the effect that, through the more open and deregulated international economy, belligerents not only want to maintain, but developed an deep economic interest in continuing the conflict. Charles Taylor made en estimated revenue of US $ 75 million per year in exploiting of Liberia’s resources (like diamond, gold, iron ore and so on). Taking this example into account, the point of new wars is not to win but rather to legitimise actions that in peacetime would be crimes (Berdal 2003:485-486). But exploiting the resources of a state is a common characteristic of war. “Plundering is a practice as ancient as warfare itself” (Lerner 2007: 1). In addition, Newman states, that not all contemporary conflicts are fought because of economic reasons and conflicts. For example the conflicts in Chechnya, India or Sri Lanka were based on ideological purposes (Newman 2004: 183). It has been shown on the basis of these three examples, that characterising conflict into old and new does not necessarily help to understand the transformation of war. Of course, contemporary conflict differs from old conflict and surly it can be argued that post Cold War conflicts have changed in complexity, motives, support, violence, frequency and so on. But simultaneously it has been shown that the given characteristic of new wars are not necessarily new and therefore are only partly suitable for explaining its transformation. The debate about old and new wars surly has fostered a stronger discourse about (civil-) war and enhanced our understanding of conflict but does not explore the various different factors that causes conflict in the first place. Out of this reasoning the utility of the old and new war approach lies not within the description / differentiation of contemporary conflicts but comes from its capacity to influence scholarship and policy.
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